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ABSTRACT
This paper considers some aspects of Theodore
Roosevelt's terra as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from
April 19, 1897 to I%y 10, 1B98. The first chapter outlines
the sea power thesis of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and the
second chapter establishes Roosevelt's early interest in the
service which culminated in his appointment to the post of
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
The third chapter shows to what extent Roosevelt
followed the sea power notions of Captain Mahan. While
Roosevelt followed Mahan's sea

jwsr thesis in many respects

he did not see its chief significance until after the
Spanish American War. The significance of Mahan's sea power
thesis rested on the importance of commerce.
The fourth chapter shows how Roosevelt was virtually
in charge of the Department of the Navy due to the absences
of Secretary of the Navy, John Davis Long. Roosevelt
prepared the department and the country for war. The fifth
chapter shows how well Roosevelt's preparations met the test
of war and how Secretary of the Navy, John Long, attempted
to obtain some of the credit for the Navy's success in the
Spanish American War of 1898.

Ill
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PREFACE

During Theodore Roosevelt’s term as the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, April 19, 1897 - I4ay 10, 1898,
interest in naval and commercial expansion in the United
States came to a critical point of development. Alfred
Thayer Mahan was largely responsible for making naval and
commercial ideas popular. This paper examines the influence
of Mahan’s ideas on Roosevelt during this period.
It also examines the relationship which existed
between the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, and his
Assistant Secretary, Roosevelt himself.
The first chapter outlines the theory of sea power
as it was presented in Mahan’s book The Influence of Seapower
Upon History and in his other writings during this period.
The second chapter establishes the fact that Roosevelt had a
long standing interest in the navy and in important naval
personages. It concludes with a discussion of the
circumstances of Roosevelt's appointment as Assistant Sec
retary . J the Navy.
The third chapter discusses the extent to which
Roosevelt followed Mahan's ideas in administering the
Department of the Navy. It traces the significant influence
of Mahan on Roosevelt and explains the critical point at
iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

which Roosevelt did not follow Mahan.
The fourth chapter discusses the overriding influence
which Roosevelt, though only the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, came to have in the Department. The final chapter
outlines briefly some of John D. Lo n g ’s later views which
throw into relief his relationship with Roosevelt during
the period considered by this paper.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Theodore Roosevelt held the position of Assistant
Secretary of the Navy from April 19, 1897 to May 10, 1898.
During these approximately thirteen months a large part of
the early legend of Roosevelt was established.

The

developing crisis with Spain, which occurred during this
period, had almost reached war proportions with the sinking
of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbour on February 15,
1898.

In order to deliver a crippling blow at the Spanish,

should war result, Roosevelt sent a dispatch on February 25,
1898 to Dewey who was in command of the Asiatic squadron. The
Assistant Secretary who was in charge of the affairs in the
Navy Department on the afternoon of February 25, 1898, ordered
the Asiatic squadron to Hong Kong where Dewey was to keep
the ships full of coal.

If war were declared it was to be the

duty of the Asiatic commander to prevent the Spanish
squadron from leaving the Asiatic coast.

Dewey was to remain

on the flagship Olympia and then begin offensive operations
in the Philippine Islands.^

It was this effort of

preparedness which made possible the successful campaign
of the United States fleet against the Spanish in the
^ George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey
iNew York, 1913), p. 17?:
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Philippines.
It is often assumed that this dispatch by Roosevelt
in late February was an impetuous act by the junior
executive that was completed while the Secretary of the Navy
2
was absent from the office.
But it appears to the present
writer from a careful reading of Roosevelt's correspondence
and other related sources that this act was really the
climax of a series of efforts in an attempt to prepare the
navy and the country for war.

It is just one of the many

instances which show for all intents and purposes that
Roosevelt was really the Secretary of the Navy.
Furthermore, Roosevelt was influenced by Mahan's sea
power thesis and its significance for the United States*
Accordingly, Roosevelt wao intensely i/..u ::ested in the
strengthening of the navy.

There seems to be a tacit

assumption that Roosevelt's acceptance of Mahan's sea power

^ Dulles comments on the dispatch sent to Dewey. "It
had been sent by Roosevelt.
Impatient for war to break out,
anxious that Dewey should have authorization for prompt
action, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy had seized the
opportunity of his chief's temporary absence from his office
to carry preparations for war a good step farther. . . ."
Foster Rhea Dulles, America in the Pacific (Boston, 1932),
p. 204. In a later work Dulles refers to the presence of the
American fleet off the Philippines as being "due to an
unusual series of events." Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise
to World Power 1898 - 1954 (New York, 1955), p. 42. Referring
to the dispatch John D. Long wrote in his diary that "the
very devil seemed to possess" his assistant the afternoon he
cabled Dewey. Lawrence Shaw Mayo, ed., America of Yesterday
as Reflected in the Journal of John Davis Long TSoston, 1923),
p. 1 6 9 . Most general works seem to agree with the assumption.
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thesis was total and unconditional.

This seems to be too

sweeping a statement.
To evaluate Mahan's influence on Roosevelt it is
necessary, at this point, to outline the basic principles of
Mahan's sea power thesis.

Mahan's philosophy of sea power

was compounded from two distinct theories. One was the theory
of naval strategy and defense.

The other was the theory of

national prosperity based on a program of mercantilistic
imperialism.

From these two theories there evolved a number

of basic concepts, each of which can be considered as a part
of the total sea power thesis.

These basic concepts were:

(1) Force to replace arbitration on the world scene.
(2) An increase in the size oi ere navy.
(3) Preparation for war in time of peace.
(4) Concentration of the fleet.
(5) The adoption of a world outlook which entailed
Cuba, Hawaii, the Philippines and the Panama Canal.
(6) The importance of commerce.
Mahan saw that force was the determining factor
3
between states.
Arbitration was a good thing but force was
a necessary factor and the navy was going to supply that
force. ' He desired to preserve a martial spirit which alone
could cope "with the destructive forces which from outside

^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower
Upon History (1890) (New York, Ï957) , p. 2$."
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and from within threaten to submerge all that the centuries
4
have gained."
He looked upon the armaments of Europe as an
insurance of peace among the Western Powers.^

In the struggle

between nations sea power would play a dominant role.
If the navy was going to supply the force in the
future struggle between nations, there existed the necessity
6
of building ships.
Mahan hoped that the United States would
embark on a program of overseas expansion as this would
7
necessitate increasing the size of the navy greatly.
He was
convinced that the United States was destined to become a
8
world power.
In order to accomplish this goal the size of
the navy had to be increased.

It was necessary to have a

large fleet in order to support the entire concept of this
sea power thesis.
The necessity of preparing for war in time of peace
was one of the basic principles of the sea power thesis.

^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Possibilities of an Anglo American Reunion", North American Review. CLIX (1894), 558.
^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Isthmus and Sea Power",
Atlantic Monthly, LXXII (1893), 472. Also Alfred Thayer
Mahan, "The'Future in Relation to American Naval Power",
Harper's Magazine. XCI (1895), 775.
^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Preparedness for Naval
War", Harper's Magazine. XCIV (1897), 584, 586.
7
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower
Upon History (1890) (New York, 1957), p. 75.
a
Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The United States Looking
Outward", Atlantic Monthly. LXVI (1890), 8l6.
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This principle involved the preparation of material and the
ability to use that material on short notice. Only when these
preparations were completed could it be said that the country
was prepared for war,9

If the navy was going to accomplish

its purpose and play a dominant role in the future of the
United States, it was necessary to prepare it during peace
time so that it would be an efficient fighting machine
during war.

This new concept of a prepared navy would

necessitate the complete reorganization of the old system.
This would allow young and efficient officers to take over
responsible positions.

With efficient officers at the helm

they would be able to use the war materials effectively on
short notice.

The object of Mahan's thinking was the

efficiency of the entire fleet.
Officers who were well versed in text-book principles
would be utterly useless unless they had practical
experience.

If the navy were going to be used as an object of

force as Mahan's views on arbitration indicated, it would be
absolutely necessary to have trained men on board.

It was

imperative that the men be able to handle the war materials
effectively on short notice.
hand in hand.

Training and preparedness went

The training of men was most important if the

^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Preparedness for Naval War",
Harper's Magazine, XCIV (1897;, 583.
Ibid., XCIV, 586.
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United States were going to follow its destiny and become a
11
world power.
The necessity of preparing material and
having efficient officers and trained men to use that
material on short notice were essentials in the preparation
for war in time of peace.
Mahan believed that the new American fleet had to be
12
concentrated if the United States were going to control
the approaches to her own borders. The sea power thesis was
very closely related to strategy and "the essence of Mahan’s
strategy lay in this concept of the command of the sea, this
13
doctrine of concentration of power."
It would serve very
little purpose to construct con.eal
United States.

I'Jhat was needed wa: a

essels to protect the
fleet that was

able to go ^ road and destroy the enemy before he came to
the shores of the United States.

This fleet had to be

concentrated in order to be effective, and Mahan believed in
this basic principle of the concentration of the fleet.

Ibid.
1O

Concentration for Mahan entailed two basic principles,
the strategic location of ships at decisive points with
coaling stations to support that fleet and the necessity of
not dividing or dispersing the ships. The total destruction
of the enemy fleet was the primary consideration and this was
to be done by a superior naval force. Preying upon commercial
vessels was a good thing, but it was considered as being
secondary to concentration. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence
of Seapower Upon History (1890) (New York, 1957;, pp. 7-13.
13
William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power
(Norman, Oklahoma, 1947), p. 214.
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The adoption of a world outlook which entailed Cuba,
Hawaii, the Philippines and the Panama Canal was a necessary
principle of the sea power thesis.
resulted in coal driven ships.

The new age of technology

The age of sail had passed

and in order to give the new warships an increased radius,
coaling stations were needed.

By 1890, Mahan saw that the

American people were at last awakening to the greater
14
opportunities awaiting them overseas.
This expansion abroad,
would give the United States colonies which would provide
resting places for the ships^^ where they could coal and

. 16
repair.
The key in the coming struggle as far as Mahan was
concerned was the Panama Canal.

It had become "a strategic
17
18
centre of . . . vital importance."
Security of the Canal

Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The United States Looking
Outward", Atlantic Monthly. LXVI (1890), 8l6 ff.
15

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower
Upon History (1890) (New York, 1957), p. 25.
Ibid.. pp. 27, 72.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The United States Looking
Outward", Atlantic Monthly. LXVI (1890), 819.
l8
At this early time Mahan expressed himself as being
in favour of controlling the approaches to the proposed canal.
Later he came to the realization that if the canal were
sufficiently protected by land fortifications, this waterway
would serve as an effective bridge for the fleet of the United
States, thereby eliminating the need"of maintaining a
battleship fleet in each ocean. Alfred Thayer Mahan,
"Why Fortify the Panama Canal?", North American Review.
CXCIII (1911), 331-9. This was the first real publicexpression
by Mahan of eliminating the two ocean navy.
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a
demanded the establishment of naval supremacy over the
19
Caribbean
and the Eastern Pacific. This in turn demanded
the acquisition and development of naval bases at strategic
20
21
points --- especially in Cuba
and Hawaii.
It was
22
necessary to have bases in the Caribbean
if the United
23
States intended to protect the future Canal.
Cuba was
considered to be much more important than Jamaica as a naval
24
base
as the operations of the American fleet could be
easily transferred from one side of the Caribbean to the
other in the event that the United States’ fleet was
25
inferior in size to the enemy’s fleet.
Possession of Hawaii would serve the purpose of
protecting the Canal as well as the Pacific seaboard.

26

19

Alfred Thayer Mahan, ’’A Twentieth Century
Outlook’’, Harper’s Mhgazine. XCV (1897), 533»
20
Alfred Thayer Mahan, ’’Strategic Features of
the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea’’, Harper’s Magazine,
XCV (1897), 680.
21
Alfred Thayer Mahan, ’’Hawaii and our Future
Sea Power” , Forum, XV (1893), 1.
22
Alfred Thayer i4ahan, The Influence of Seapower
Upon History (1890) (New York, 1957), p. JO.
Ibid., p. 29.
24

A' red Thayer Mahan, ’’Strategic Features of
the Gulf of . exico and the Caribbean Sea’’, Harper’s Magazine.
XCV (1897), 690.
Ibid.. XCV, 685.
?A

Alfred Thayer Mahan, ’’Hawaii and our Future
Sea Power’’, Forum, XV (1893), 6-8.
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Acquisition of the Philippines was considered necessary by

Mahan.

27

The development of a world outlook that included

Cuba, the Canal, Hawaii and the Philippines was a basic
principle of the sea power thesis: "Whether they will or no,
Americans must now begin to look outward.

The growing

production of the country demands it. An increasing volume
28
of public sentiment demands it."
The United States could
not remain an isolated continental power.

By necessity she

would have to adopt a larger concept of sea power.
Commerce was the most important principle of the sea
power thesis.

For Mahan there was a very close association
29
between commerce and the navy.
His entire policy was one
of naval, commercial expansion and the idea of protecting
commerce was paramount.

Mahan wanted Hawaii to support
30
American commercial expansion.
This island would also serve
as a coaling station.

Just as the navy depended upon the

merchant marine during wartime, so too did the merchant

27

The idea of acquiring the Philippines was slow to
be recognized. Roosevelt did not covet the islands until
Mahan found need for them as he planned the naval strategy of
the hoped - for war with Spain. Howard K. Beale, Theodore
Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore,

Ï95W; -p .- ^

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

78

Alfred Thayer IHahan, "The United States Looking
Outward", Atlantic Monthly, LXVI (1890), 822.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower
Upon History (1890) (New York, 1957), p. 75.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Hawaii and our Future Sea
Power", Forum, XV (1893), 6-8.
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10
31
marine rely on the navy during peace.

Even the Panama

Canal had a commercial importance for Mahan because it would
modify the direction of the trade routes.

The Canal was

important to the Caribbean Sea: "Every position in that sea
will have enhanced commercial and military value, and the
canal itself will become a strategic centre of the most
32
vital importance."
It is important to note that Mahan
placed the commercial aspect of the Canal before the military.
One thing was essential for the greatness of a nation and that
was commercial supremacy.

In order to obtain this commercial

supremacy and maintain it after it was achieved, a large and
powerful navy was necessary.
Thus we have two factors that nlay a major role in
Theodore Roosevelt’s period as Assistant Secretary of the
Navy:
(a) his own aggressive, impetuous personality and
(b) the influence of Mahan’s sea power thesis on
his thinking.
It is the hope of the writer to show in the following chapters
that :
(a) Theodore Roosevelt ’’habitually’’ assumed power in
the Navy Department and that the famous incident
of February 25, 1898, far from being an isolated

31
William E. Livezey, 0 0 . cit., pp. 48-9.
32

Alfred Thayer Mahan, ’’The United States Looking
Outward’’, Atlantic Monthly, LXVI (1890), 819.
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11
incident, was really the climax of a series of
events falling into the same basic pattern.
(b) He applied to a considerable extent Mahan’s
thesis but with a significantly different
ultimate purpose.
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CHAPTER II
ROOSEVELT’S EARLY INTEREST IN THE NAVY
A. Sea Power Enthusiasts
The appointment of Roosevelt to the position of
Assistant Secretary of the Navy on April 19, 1897 marked the
culmination of a long standing interest in that service.
During the proceeding eight years Roosevelt had maintained
an interest in naval affairs as well as in important naval
personages.

His correspondence reveals that he had spoken

with Captain Mahan as early as 139 ' ina even at that early
date they were discussing plans for exerting pressure on
Congress in the interest of naval expansion.

Roosevelt’s

early interest in naval affairs is shown by the fact that
he reviewed Mahan’s book The Influence of Seapower Upon
2
History in October of 1890. The future Assistant Secretary
realized that there was a need for a large navy composed of
cruisers and powerful battleships that could meet those of
any other nation if they were commanded to do so: ’’It is not
economy —

it is niggardly and foolish —

short-sightedness

^ Siting E. Morison, ed., Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951), I, 222.
Roosevelt to IHahan, May 12, 189C.
2
Theodore Roosevelt, "The Influence of Sea Power
Upon History, a Review", Atlantic Monthly, LXVI (1890),

563-7 .
12
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13
to cramp our naval expenditures."

3

He had been won over to

the sea power principle of preparedness and as a member of
4
the group which advocated the "large" policy, he was to
express those views of preparedness once he was appointed
Assistant Secretary^

However, a position in the navy depart

ment was not even a remote possibility in 1890.

Roosevelt

maintained a connection in public life with Secretary of the
Navy Benjamin F. Tracy from 1891 to I89I.
This public connection with Tracy was maintained at
the same time that he came out and expressed notions concern-

^ Ibid.. LXVI, 567.
4

The terra "large" was characteristically Rooseveltian
and anything that had to do with an advanced world outlook was
referred to as being part of that "large" policy. Cuba, the
Canal and Hawaii were all considered as part of that policy.
For a more complete understanding of who the supporters of
this policy were, Julius W. Pratt, "The ’Large Policy’ of
1898", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIX (1932),219-42.
^ Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten IHaxim",
Works (New York, 1926), XXIII, 182-99.
^ Benjamin F. Tracy was Secretary of the Navy from
1889 to 1 8 9 3 . An advocate of the large navy, his first annual
report was a forceful document that reflected the ideas of
Captain Mahan. The United States had to have a fleet capable
of driving the enemy from the coast "by threatening his own,
tthe enemy’s coast3, for a war, though defensive in principle,
may be conducted most effectively by being offensive in its
operations." 51 Congress, 1 Session, House Executive Document
No. 1, Part III, p. 4 .
7
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed.. Letters from Theodore
Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles 1870 - 1918 (New York,
1 9 2 4 ). p. 1 1 9 . Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, June 20,
1 8 9 1 . Also ibid., p. 125. February 12, 1893, and ibid., p.132.
December 24, 1893.
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14
ing sea power. For Roosevelt, the only way to meet any sea
power was with sea power itself. The United States had to have
a first class navy if it were to hold its own with the navy of
g
any European nation. Roosevelt saw the importance of Mahan’s
9
works but Mahan’s ideas were slow to be recognized in the
United States. Roosevelt thought it most important to have
Mahan remain in the United States.

Despite the pressure that

was applied, Mahan was given sea duty on the cruiser Chicago
in 1893 and the visit of the Chicago to England that same
year marked the beginning of fame abroad for the sea power
historianï^

Roosevelt was concerned because Mahan was

getting more attention in London that he was getting in his
11
own country. Roosevelt’s strong feeling for the navy is
shown in a private letter to his sister when he was informed
of her engagement to a naval officer.

He was overjoyec

g
Theodore Roosevelt, ’’The Influence of Sea Power
Upon The French Revolution, a Review’’, Atlantic Monthly.
LIXI (1893), 559.
9
Theodore Roosevelt, ’’The Influence of Sea Power
Upon History, a Review’’, Atlantic Monthly. LXVI (1890),
5o3-7« Also Theodore Roosevelt, ’’The Influence of Sea
Power Upon The French Revolution, a Review’’, Atlantic
Monthly LXXI (1893), 556-9, passim.
William E. Livezey, Mahan On Sea Power (Norman,
Oklahoma, 1947), p. 13.
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., op. cit.. p. 144.
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, June 3, 1894»
12

siting E. Morison, ed., pp. cit.. I, 4 6 4 . Theodore
Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, July 4, 1895.
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15
As the controversy over Venezuela took more
importance on the national scene in 1895 - 1896, the future
Assistant Secretary desired that the people of the United
States should wake up to the need of passing measures to
provide a good fleet.

13

The boundary dispute between British

Guiana and Venezuela dated back to I84O.

At that time the

British Government commissioned Sir Robert Schomburgk to
settle the dispute but the proposed settlement was rejected.
The Orinoco River was very important to the Venezuelans and
the boundary dispute revolved around the possession of land
at the mouth of this river.

Venezuelan propaganda began to

spread in the United States in 1894 and the Cleveland admin
istration came under fire for its lack of an aggressive
attitude toward Great Britain.

There was mounting protest

against Britain’s course regarding Venezuela. Secretary of
State Olney sent a defiant note to London stating that the
British were violating the Monroe Doctrine and demanding to
know whether the British would submit the dispute to arbitra
tion.

After a lengthy delay. Lord Salisbury, who directed

the foreign policy of Great Britain in 1895, replied in the
negative. Olney and Cleveland were chagrined and they drafted
a message to Congress in which the President urged that the
United States run the boundary line itself and if necessary

Ibid., I, 51 2 . Theodore Roosevelt to William
Cowles, February 11, 1896.
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16
fight to maintain it. It was a genuine crisis and war was
possible.

Roosevelt was overjoyed with the strong stand taken

by Cleveland. The virile Roosevelt wrote: "I rather hope that
the fight will come soon. The clamor of the peace faction has
convinced me that this country needs a war."^^
Yet war did not come as the British people were
unwilling to fight.

International complications with the

Boers of South Africa and the Kaiser of Germany convinced
the British to accept arbitration of the boundary dispute.
The treaty of February, 1897 provided for the submission of
15
the dispute to an arbitral board. The United States had
taken a firm stand and the action of Cleveland was an
indication that the country had finally accepted its position
in world affairs. The boundary dispute in Venezuela could
have resulted in war. The need for a navy to back up the
decisions made in Congress was obvious.

Roosevelt wanted

measures passed that would provide a good fleet and he
expressed this idea to his friend and confidant Henry Cabot
Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts and later Chairman of the

Henry Cabot Lodge, ed.. Selections from the
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge
1884 - 1918 (New York, 1925), I, 204-5. Roosevelt to Lodge,
December 27, 1895.
For a more complete discussion of the Venezuelan
dispute of 1895, refer to Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic
History of the American People. 6th ed., (New York, 1958).
pp. 43o-50. Also Dexter Perkins, A Historv of the Monroe
Doctrine, rev. ed., (Boston, 19557, pp. 1 7 2 ^ 1
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Senate Naval Affairs Committee: "More important than any
other question is, it seems to me, the matter of providing
,ev(
an adequate coast defense and an adequate Navy."^^ Roosevelt
17
maintained a friendship with speaker of the House Reed.

18

However, when Speaker Reed failed to supply the leadership
needed on the questions of the navy and coastal defense,
19
Roosevelt was greatly disappointed in him even though he
was a good friend.
The principles
There

of sea power were recognized by 1896.

was not a single naval debate in Congress

in which Mahan’s ideas

were not voiced by other

Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., op.
Roosevelt to Lodge, March 13, 1896.

cit.. I,

after 1890
men. Men

215.

17

Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., op. cit.. p. 132.
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, December 24, 1893. Also
ibid., pp. 138-3 9 . February 25, 1894. Ibid.. p. 142, May 20,
1894 and ibid.. p. I6 6 . December 22, l895.
18
Reed was the unquestioned leader of the House
Republicans in 1882, and was raised to the chair of the
speaker on December 2, 1889. He was fond of Roosevelt, but
he opposed the entire concept of administrative interference
in Cuba and Hawaii. Reed considered colonial expansion as
contrary to the American tradition and entirely impractical.
He resigned as speaker on September 4, 1899 because he was
disgusted with the McKinley Administration. Reed was known
to be a great debater. He seldom spoke for more than ten
minutes at any one time but his brief comments often
determined the course of the argument and even the fate of
the impending measure. Reed did not support Roosevelt’s
"large" policy. William A. Robinson, "Thomas Brackett
Reed", in Dumas Malone, ed.. Dictionary of American
Biography (New York, 1935), XV, 456-9.
19

Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., op. cit.. p. 178.
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, March 21, 1896.
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such as Morgan, Lodge, Hawley and MoAdoo quoted him liberally*
Roosevelt was concerned with his country’s position with
respect to the outside world:
Though I feel very strongly indeed on such
questions as municipal reform and civil service
reform, I feel even more strongly on the
questions of our attitude towards the outside
world, with all that it implies, from seacoast
defence and a first class navy, to a properly
vigorous foreign policy. I think we ought to
interfere in Cuba; and indeed I believe it
would be well were we sufficiently farsighted
steadily to shape our policy with a view to
the ultimate removal of all European powers
from the colonies they hold in the western
hemisphere. 21

22
While maintaining his public connection with the navy, he
23
continued to correspond with Captain Mahan.
In the early
part of 1897 there was talk of Roosevelt’s being offered
the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and if it
were offered he would probably take it because he was
24
’’intensely interested in our Navy.”

20

George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None (New York,
1940), p. 75*
21
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., 0£. cit.. p. 180.
Theodore Roosevelt to William Cowles, April 5, 1896.
22

Ibid., p. I8l. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna
Roosevelt, May 10, 1896.
23

Ibid., p. 202. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna
Roosevelt, Januarv 17, 1897*
24
Ibid., p. 2 0 4 . Theodore Roosevelt to Anna
Roosevelt, Januarv 17, 1897*
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Roosevelt’s interest in the service had grown over
a. period of eight years to such a degree that his ultimate
appointment as Assistant Secretary was considered as a
victory for the sea power enthusiasts.

His interest in the

navy had been fostered by public connections and personal
relations as well as from the reading of books.

He was

not one to stand idly by and when he discovered the works
of Captain Mahan he found in them ideas on international
25
affairs that were almost identical with his own.
B. Circumstances of Roosevelt’s Appointment as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy
When President McKinley chose John Davis Long to be
the head of the Navy Department it seemed a definite fore
cast of a passive naval policy.

The new Secretary, a former

governor of Massachusetts, was a man of good qualities, but

25

It would be false to say that Captain Mahan’s
work was received by all in the same light. His thesis
concerning sea power was being used widely in England and
Germany and was going a long way toward shaping the destiny
of those two countries.
Captain W.D. Puleston, Mahan (New
Haven, 1939), p. 159. Yet it would be unfair to say that
Mahan’s writings influenced Turpitz, the recognized genius
of the German fleet. William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of
Imperialism 1890 - 1902 (New York, 1951J, p. 441* James
Bryce openly disagreed with Mahan.
James Bryce, ’’The Policy
of Annexation for the United States” , Forum. XXIV (1897),
385-95»
Carl Schurz disagreed with Mahan.
Carl Schurz,
”Manifest Destiny” , Harper’s Magazine. LXXVII (1893), 737-46.
Fred Jane was also one to disagree with Mahan. Fred T. Jane,
"Naval Warfare: Present and Future” , Forum. XXIV (1897),
8-17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20
26
he had a cautious temperment.

Naval reconstruction had

begun in the eighteen eighties and if the policy of expansion
of the navy were to continue leadership from within the
Department seemed especially unfavourable because of the
conservative outlook of the new Secretary of the Navy, John
Davis Long.

Leadership might have been provided by the Chief

of the Bureau of Navigation, but he, too, was against the
27
expansion of the navy.
A partial victory was obtained by the advocates
of the "large” policy when Theodore Roosevelt was appointed
to the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

The former

Police Commissioner of New York had been influenced by Henry
Cabot Lodge to accept the post if it were offered. A great
many people wanted McKinley to offer the post to Roosevelt
because of the tremendous work he had done for the Party in
helping to defeat Bryan in 1896.

Roosevelt was rather

indifferent in the matter and he was not sure whether he
should take the position.

Not only did he lack pronounced

backers of political influence in his own state, but he also

26
Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American
Naval Power 1776 - 1918 (Princeton, 1939), p. 224.
27
The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation was the
principal professional adviser to the Secretary of the Navy
on technical questions and personnel. Rear - Admiral
A. S. Crowninshield, who held the position of Chief of the .
Bureau of Navigation at this time, was an ultraconservative
officer. George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey
(New York, 1913), p. 167.
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realized that the position of Assistant Secretary of the
Navy was "not a big p l a c e . D i s c o u r a g e m e n t in his position
as Police Commissioner led him in the early part of 1897 to
express his willingness to accept the job if it were offered
29
to him.
While Roosevelt sat back and waited, advocates of
the notion of sea power were busily at work pressing for
his appointment.

Lodge had gone to see Secretary Long who

seemed quite impressed with the possibility of having
Roosevelt as his Assistant Secretary and spoke very highly
30
of him.
Long was willing to agree to the appointment. The
31
only difficulty appeared to be at the White House.
The way Roosevelt handled himself in the role of
police Commissioner of New York caused the conservative
32
President McKinley some concern. The pressure to appoint
Roosevelt was increased and as a result he became the new
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

Roosevelt was pleased:

28

Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed. 0£. cit.. pp. 199-200.
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, December 20, 1896.
29
Ibid.. p. 204 . Theodore Roosevelt to Anna
Roosevelt, February 21, 1897.
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 0£. cit.. I, 253»
Lodge to Roosevelt, March 8, 1897*
Ibid.
32

Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt A Biographv
(New York, 1931), p. 165.
33
Lodge had gone to see President - elect McKinley
at Canton, Ohio in an attempt to secure Roosevelt’s appoint
ment. Lodge, ed., ££. cit.. I, 24I. Lodge to Roosevelt,
December 2, 1896.
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I was even more pleased than I was astonished
at the appointment; for I had come to look
upon it as very improbable. McKinley rather
distrusted me, and Platt actively hated me;
it was Cabot’s untiring energy and devotion
which put me in; and Long really wanted me. 34
When Long heard of the appointment he noted in his journal
35
that Roosevelt was the best man for the place.
The appointment of Roosevelt was a victory for the
advocates of sea power for Roosevelt was looked upon as
being one of their own select group.

He had commented

favourably on the books written by Mahan and expressed his
views concerning the need for a large navy in his private
letters.

The driving force of Roosevelt was going to

counteract the slow moving conservative Secretary. Through
out the next year Roosevelt laboured to convert Secretary
Long and President McKinley to his view of naval needs and
policy through his administrative activities and his public
V,

Sp66 Cn6S #

36

Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., on. cit., p. 207*
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, April 11, 1897*
33 Lawrence Shaw Mayo, ed., America of Yesterday
as Reflected in the Journal of John Davis Long iBoston,
1923), p. 147.
3^ Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Boston, 1931),
p. 81. Also Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His
Time (New York, 1920), I, 82-4. Also Henry Cabot Lodge,
ed., op. cit.« I, 276-8 , 2 8 4 . Roosevelt to Lodge, September
1 5 , 1 7 September 21, 1897 and September 29, 1897.

W,
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CHAPTER III
ROOSEVELT AND THE CONCEPT OF SEA POV/ER
Roosevelt in his career as Assistant Secretary
reflected with reservations Mahan’s thesis. Even in the
absence of Mahan’s ideas, Roosevelt believed that force and
not arbitration was the significant factor in a country’s
development if it were to take an honourable place as a
world power.

It was in the address at the Naval War College
2
that Roosevelt expressed his ideas on diplomacy, arbitration
and preparedness.

This speech, later published under the title

Î
Secretary of the Navy Chandler established the Naval
War College at Newport, Rhode Island, in Navy Department
General Order Number 325 of October 6, 1884*
Commodore
Stephen Luce was its first president.
Captain Mahan was first
appointed to the college as a lecturer and served later as
president. His lectures at the college later resulted in his
work The Influence of Seapower Upon History. The purpose of
the college is to prepare officers for higher command.
In an
effort to do this, naval history, policy, strategy, tactics,
coast defense, naval construction, gunnery and international
law are touched upon. The college is meant for senior officers
of the rank of lieutenant commander and above.
Officers of the
other services are invited to attend in an effort to achieve
co-ordination. At the request of the Naval War College,
Theodore Roosevelt addressed the students in June of 1897.
Captain John Stapler, "The Naval War College", United States
Naval Institute Proceedings. LVIII (1932), 1157 - 63.
2
Whenever Mahan made reference to non-violent methods
of handling international relations, he always used the term
arbitration. Whenever Roosevelt made reference to this same
problem, he usually used the term diplomacy which entailed
more than arbitration, and more than just the use of external
force. His later activities as President with respect to the
Panama Canal illustrate this point

23
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3
"Washington’s Forgotten Maxim", reflected Mahan’s sea power
views.
A. The War College Speech
This major address of 1897 was delivered by the
Assistant Secretary on June 2 to the Naval War College at
Newport.

Roosevelt spoke on the subject of national

preparedness.

He had spoken on this before, but this is

the first time that he received national attention as a
spokesman for this subjectif"
From this time until his death he was a national
figure. This address showed serious thought and study. It
was clearly the result of several years of contemplation^
In this War College Address, Roosevelt gave his ideas on
sea power.

The address was notable as the first elaborate

expression of Roosevelt’s views on preparation. I'Jhen he later
became President, Roosevelt’s views on national preparedness
were a reflection of the principal ideas contained in this
address.

The Assistant Secretary stressed the need for being

3
Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten Î4axim",
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 182-99. This speech was first
published in the official navy journal United States Naval
Institutes Proceedings, XXIII (1897), and later distributed
throughout the service. Report of the President of the Naval
War College and Torpedo School, House Document No. 1, Part
III, p. 136.
^ Lewis Einstein, Roosevelt, His Mind in Action
(Boston, 1930), p. 66.
^ Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and his Time
(New York, 1920), I, 74. Also Lewis Einstein, op. cit.-,
p. 66.
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prepared:
In this country there is not the slightest
danger of an over - development of warlike
spirit, and there has never been any such
danger.
In all our history there has never
been a time when preparedness for war was
any menace to peace.
On the contrary, again
and again we have owed peace to the fact that
we were prepared for war. 6
In this address he appealed to patriotism in an effort to
convince the people of the necessity of preparedness for
war:
The United States has never once in the
course of its history suffered harm because
of preparation for war, or because of
entering into war. But we have suffered
incalculable harm, again and again, from a
foolish failure to prepare for war or from
reluctance to fight when to fight was
proper. The men who today protest against
a navy, and protest also against every
movement to carry out the traditional policy
of the country in foreign affairs, and to
uphold the honor of the flag, are themselves
but following in the course of those who
protest against the acquisition of the great
West. 7
His later views on arbitration were consistent with the
ideas expressed in this speech:
Preparation for war is the surest
guaranty for peace. Arbitration is an excellent
thing, but ultimately those who wish to see
this country at peace with foreign nations
will be wise if they place reliance upon a
first-class fleet of first-class battleships
rather than on any arbitration treaty which

6
Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten Maxim",
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 182.
^ Ibid.. ÏIII, 187.
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g
the wit of man can devise.
The use of force was necessary: "No nation can hold its
place in the world, . . . unless it stands ready to guard
9
its rights with an armed hand."
Diplomacy placed second
to force: "Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no
force behind it; the diplomat is the servant, not the
10
master, of the soldier."
Appealing to patriotismthrough
out the speech, he closed on the verv same note that
opened his talk.

he had

It was an appeal for a large navy:

We ask for a great navy, partly because we
think that the possession of such a navy is
the surest guaranty of peace, and partly
because we feel that no national life is
worth having if the nation is not willing,
when the need shall arise, to stake
everything on the supreme arbitrament of war,
and to pour out its blood, its treasure, and
its tears like water, rather than submit to
the loss of honor and renown. 11
The speech sounded a new note in the conduct of national
affairs.

It was a convincing appeal to American sentiment,

but more important than that, it was a reflection of Mahan’s
notions concerning a large navy, preparedness for war and
12
arbitration.

^ Ibid.. XIII, 183.
9 Ibid.. XIII, 185.
Ibid.. XIII, 195.
Ibid.. XIII, 198.
1O
For a comparison with Captain Mahan on these points.
see above pp. 3-5*
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B, Force and Arbitration
Roosevelt gave his views on arbitration in his
important address at the Naval War College. The Assistant
Secretary firmly believed in using force instead of
arbitration. He thought that arbitration was an excellent
thing, but in the end if peace were to be maintained with a
foreign power little faith could be placed in an arbitration
treaty. Reliance should be placed upon a "first-class fleet
of first-class battleships rather than on any arbitration
13
treaty."
He wanted the United States to take its place on
the world scene. If the United States were willing to press
its demands and talk in terms of a major power, the navy
was most important to make her position secure:
Still more is it necessary to have a fleet of
great battle-ships if we intend to live up to the
Monroe Doctrine, and to insist upon its observance
in the two Americas and the islands on either side
of them. If a foreign power, whether in Europe or
Asia, should determine to assert its position in
those lands wherein we feel that our influence
should be supreme, there is but one way in which
we can effectively interfere. Diplomacy is utterlv
useless where there is no force behind i t : the
diplomat is the servant, not the master, of the
soldier. %îtalics mine)
14
There were others in Congress who spoke in the very same
tone. They had come to realize that force was the only thing

1 "Z

.

Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten Maxim",
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 183.
Ibid., XIII, 195.
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15
that mattered*
In August of 1897 Roosevelt again reiterated his
conviction that the navy should be used instead of
arbitration: "As an American I should advocate —
matter of fact do advocate —

and as a

keeping our Navy at a pitch

that will enable us to interfere promptly if Germany
ventures to touch a foot of American soil."

16

Using the

navy to enforce statements concerning international affairs,
for example, the Monroe Doctrine, is very closely associated
with the concept of having the United States come from its
position of isolation to that of a world power. The advocates
of the sea power thesis desired to use physical force to make
the United States a world and international power.

17

Roosevelt

Senator Charles W. Jones implied that nations
would not pay attention to decrees unless the country had
the physical force to back them up. "What do the nations of
the earth care about your moral power after you leave your
own shores." Cited by Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to
World Power 1898 - 1954 (New York, 1955), pp. 27-8. In Naval
debates in Congress, Morgan, Lodge, Hawley and McAdoo quoted
I4ahan's ideas liberally. George T. Davis, A Navy Second to
None (New York, 1940), p. 75»
Elting E. Morison, ed.. Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1 9 5 D , ”T, 645« Roosevelt
to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, August 13, 1897*
17
It is interesting to note that despite the backing
that Henry Cabot Lodge gave to Mahan's ideas on sea power,
(Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy", Forum.
XIX (1895), 17* and Congressional Record. 53 rd Congress 3rd
session (1895) P* 3084*) he differed from the sea power
historian in one significant respect. Lodge thought that the
United States had to come out of its isolation but he
opposed any entanglement in world politics. Foster Rhea
Dulles, America's Rise to World Power 1898 - 1954 (New
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was no exception in this respect.
When Long returned to his office late in September
of 1897 after an absence of almost two months, Roosevelt
presented him with a resume of the events that had occurred
during the former's absence.

The Assistant Secretary urged

that the Administration provide a sufficient navy to enforce
any assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the American
hemisphere.

It would be useless to make those assertions if

the Administration did not have the warships to back up its
18 .
claims.
Roosevelt knew that proposing such an aggressive
policy would have very little effect on the conservative
Secretary so he couched his proposition in reference to
peace, a term that Long would understand: "A great navy does
not make for war, but for peace. It is the cheapest kind of
19
insurance."
Roosevelt presented an aggressive program for
^
20
the Philippines to the President in September of 1897, and
this program shows that the Assistant Secretary was willing to
use force as opposed to arbitration.

Roosevelt’s actions

after the sinking of the Maine in Havana Harbor and the

York, 1955), p. 35. Lodge desired to use the navy only to
guard the western hemisphere.
l8
Elting E. Morison, ed.,
cit.. I, 695.
Roosevelt to Long, September 30, 1897.
Ibid.
20 For a discussion of this aggressive program,
see below p. 41-2.
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famous dispatch of February 25, 1898, illustrate the same
theme.

Force had become the controlling factor in world

affairs.
C. Increasing the Size of the Navy
Roosevelt's correspondence during the months following
his appointment as Assistant Secretary made reference to the
need for a navy.

In August he expressed the wish that "our
22
people would wake up to the need for a big navyI"
In
September he wrote to Lodge informing him that a conference

was held with Secretary Long concerning "the need for an
increase in the Navy."

23

Roosevelt was merely restating his

idea of the need for a navy which he had expressed in his
address at the Naval War College: "We ask that the work of
upbuilding the navy and the putting of the United States
where it should be put among maritime powers, go forward
without a break."2^
Roosevelt's efforts indicate that he was an advocate
of a large navy.

On August 3, 1897, he was quite concerned

21

For a comparison with Mahan's views on arbitration,
see above pp. 3-4»
22
Cited by Joseph B. Bishop, 0£. cit.. I, 78.
Roosevelt to Captain B. H. McCalla, U.S.N., August 7, 1897*
23 Henry Cabot Lodge, ed.. Selections from the
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge
1884 - 19Ï8 iNew York, 1925), I, 284. Roosevelt to Lodge,
September 29, 1897.
OI

Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington's Forgotten.Maxim",
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 195.
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over the armor plate businesi^and feared that if the yards
26
stopped building they would never begin again. The issue
had been complicated because the bulk of the people were
ignorant of naval matters and yet they were full of self
27
confidence. Roosevelt was making a serious attempt to

25

Armor plate was first introduced in 1889 by the
British. At this point, naval architecture had advanced so
the term protected cruiser, no longer used, designated a
warship with a thick steel deck designed to give some
protection to the interior of the vessels. Armored warships battleships and armored cruisers (which later evolved into the
battle cruiser) - carried armor plate on their sides as well
as on their decks. These ships carried anywhere from 14" to
18" of armor across the entire upper deck. Technical
difficulties were encountered, and the ships were redesigned
to have anywhere from 14" to 18" of armor at midships to
protect the vital machinery, with the bow and stern covered
with approximately 8" of armor plate. Armor plate was also
placed below the waterline of these ships after 1900, and
this led to more technical problems.
The process of making this armor plate was quite
complex. It was necessary to keep the armor plates in the
furnaces anywhere from 20 to 2$ days depending on the
hardness desired. One side of the plate was kept at a
relatively high temperature (1600° F) and the other side of
the plate was kept relatively low. Carbon would be placed on
the hot side but would not be allowed to seep through the
entire piece as this would make the plate too brittle. The
plate was then removed from the furnace and cooled in oil or
water. This complex process would have to be repeated if the
plate had to be straightened or moulded. The furnaces to
produce this armor plate were perfected by Martin Siemens.
A new and faster method was perfected after the turn of the
century. It was called carburo didrogino. Carlo Goffi,
Tecnica Moderna Degli Acciai (Milano. 1917) pp. 13-6, 30-7,
50-3, 67^7^, 136-9. Also Arturo Massenz, Lavorazione E
Tempera Degli Acciai (Milano, 1921), bP* T96-20i,
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., o£. cit.. I, 268.
Roosevelt to Lodge, August 3, 1897»
2^ Elting E. Morison, ed., o^. cit.. I, 637.
Roosevelt to William Cowles, August 3, Ï897.
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convince the people of the need for a building program for
the navy: "It would be horrible folly to stop building up
28
our navy now."
In an attempt to reach the people, the
Assistant Secretary wrote to Secretary Long and sent him
the proof of a proposed article. The conservative Secretary
commanded that Roosevelt strike out those portions where he
urged the increase in the size of the navy. The letter that
Long returned showed that he was kind in tone toward the
Assistant, but it also showed that despite the pressure of
the Assistant, the Secretary was still against any increase
29
whatever in the navy.
A few weeks later the

again attempted to

convince the Secretary that government policy should allow

Ibid.. I, 637 . Roosevelt to Dana, August 3, 1897.
Charles Anderson Dana was born August 8, 1819 and died
October 17, 1897. A newspaper editor, he acquired the "New
York Sun" in I867 and assumed the editorship on January 25,
1868. This leader of public opinion advocated the annexation
of Cuba. A follower of the large policy, he abused Cleveland
for his conciliatory foreign policy. Roosevelt tried to get
to the public through Dana, as the "New York Sun" was recog
nized as being an influential paper in 1897* Allan Nevins,
"Charles Anderson Dana", in Dumas Malone and Allen Johnson,
eds.. Dictionary of American Biographv (New York, 1930), V,

49- 52.

29

Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., o£. cit., I, 273*
Roosevelt to Lodge, August 26, 1897* After the Spanish
American War, Long maintained this attitude concerning the
building up of the navy. John Davis Long, "Shall the Navy
Be Increased", Independent. LVIII (1905), 639-41* However, he
did come to the realization that it was folly to wait to the
last minute to prepare for war. John Davis Long, The New
American Navy (New York, I903 ), I, 151*
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the building of two or more battleships or cruisers every
30
year.
The steady upbuilding of the navy was a necessary
principle of sea power so far as Roosevelt was concerned.
On September 30, 1897, Roosevelt wrote a long and formal
letter to the Secretary urging in all earnestness that the
Navy Department do "all it can to further a steady and rapid
upbuilding of our Navy."

31

The exactness of the report and

the conviction of the Assistant Secretary are obvious:
I believe that Congress should at once
give us six (6) new battleships, two (2) to
be built on the Pacific and four (4 ) on the
Atlantic; six (6) large cruisers, of the size
of the Brooklyn, but in armament more nearly
approaching the Argentine vessel San Martin;
and seventy - five (75) torpedo boats, twentyfive (25 ) for the Pacific and fifty (50) for the
Atlantic. I believe that we should set about
building all these craft now, and that each
one should be, if possible, the most formidable
of its kind afloat, 32
The pressure that had been put on the Secretary by
the Assistant began to tell. Roosevelt wrote to Lodge in
strict confidence informing him that the principle of the
extension of the navy had been won. The Secretary had
3^ Elting E. Morison, ed. op. cit.. I, 67I.
Roosevelt to Long, September 10, 1ÏÏ97* Roosevelt reasoned
with the Secretary that if the government had a steady
building program, armor for these ships could be obtained at
a fairly cheap rate, but otherwise not. The best way to go
about this would be to approach civilian firms. Government
firms would be more expensive and there would probably be
more than a few blunders at the beginning.
Ibid.. I, 695 . Roosevelt to Long, September 30,
1897.
Ibid.. I, 696.
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agreed to recommend one additional battleship as well as
additional torpedo boats. Roosevelt realized that it was
very little, yet he understood that the recognition of the
principle of extension had been won and that he was not to
stop.

33
The Secretary may have been won over to this prin

ciple because of Roosevelt’s action. On September 14, 1897,
while Long was absent from Washington on an extended summer
vacation, Roosevelt had gone to the President and secured
an overruling of the conservative Secretary on the principle
of an increase in the navy at that time. The President was
satisfied with what Roosevelt hac lone during the seven weeks
that he was in charge of the Department:
To my great pleasure he also told me that
he intended we should go on building up the
Navy, with battleships and torpedo boats, and
that he did not think that the Secretary would
recommend anything he (the President) c s i c T did
not approve. Altogether I had a very satisfactory
talk. 34
Roosevelt kept up the pressure to have the navy
increased. He had told Captain Mahan that he would do every35
thing in his power to impress sea power ideas on the Secretary.

33 Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 0£. cit.. I, 294*
Roosevelt to Lodge, November 5, 1897.
Ibid.. I, 277 . Roosevelt to Lodge, September 15, 1897<
33 Elting E. Morison, ed., op. cit., I, 607 . Roosevelt
to Mahan, May 3, 1897.
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The sinking of the Maine on February 15, 1898, afforded the
Assistant with his best opportunity.

With forceful language

he sought to convince the Secretary of a need for more
torpedo boats, raising that total to one hundre^^

On the very
37
next day he urged Long to order additional battleships. He
had proven himself to be an advocate of a large navy.

His

actions while in the Department were ever directed to having
the navy increased in size.

After Secretary Long had been

eased out of the new President’s Cabinet in 1902, he commented
upon the procurement of ships during his tenure as Secretary of
the Navy: ’’The labor of purchasing vessels devolved to a great
extent upon the office of the assistant secretary, and Mr.
Roosevelt and Mr. Allen were successively efficient in pro39
curing ships for the service.’’
Roosevelt saw that a large
navy was necessary and he worked toward obtaining that large
40
navy while he was Assistant Secretary.

.

3^ Ibid.« I. 775-9. Roosevelt to Long, February 18,

1898

37

Joseph B. Bishop, pp. cit.. I, 85-6.

38

Allen took over the position of Assistant Secretary
after Roosevelt resigned in May of 1898 to join the array.
3^ John Davis Long. The New American N a w (New York.
1903), I, 152.
To compare this with Mahan’s view on a large navy,
see above p. 4»

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36
D. Preparation for War in Time of Peace
Roosevelt sought to achieve preparedness in the
Department of the Navy even though he only held the position
of Assistant Secretary.

Before he delivered the address at

the Naval War College, he had written to Mahan asking that
his letter be considered as entirely confidential as his
position allowed him only to carry out the policy of the
Secretary and the President. The Assistant Secretary
expressed the desire to build a dozen new battleships to be
41
equally distributed on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.
Roosevelt realized that it was necessary to have ships, but
he realized that it was just as necessary to be able to
42
handle those ships effectively on a moments notice.
Throughout the critical period of 1897 to 1898
Roosevelt sought to increase the efficiency of the navy.
The squadron manoeuvres illustrate Roosevelt’s desire for
preparedness and efficiency of the fleet. On September 23,
1897, the Assistant Secretary wrote to Senator Chandler
concerning the estimates for the department stressing the
need to increase the estimates where they related to warlike

Elting E. Morison, ed., pp. cit., I, 607.
Roosevelt to Mahan, May 3, 1897.
On March 17, 1897, Roosevelt wrote to Lodge with
reference to the completion of the former’s work on The War
of 1812. Roosevelt stated that it contained a strong plea
for a powerful navy and the ability to handle that navy
effectively. Henry Cabot. Lodge, ed., pp. pit.. I, 255,
Roosevelt to Lodge.
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efficiency and decrease the estimates where they related to
43
comfort. An old acquaintance commented in Century Magazine
that while Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary he mastered the
problems of the department and made the navy an efficient
44
fighting machine.
One of the problems that was hindering the navy from
becoming an efficient fighting machine was the antagonism of
45
the line officers and the engineers.
Secretary Long had
^3 Elting E. Morison, ed., pp. cit.. I, 688.
Roosevelt to Senator Chandler, September 23, 1897* "We do
need smokeless powder, shells and torpedoes. I am doing my
best to prevent them from asking for too much for barracks,
for new buildings, and for anything pertaining merely to
comfort of the Department; but for what relates to its war
like efficiency I feel we should strain every effort." It
must be remembered that Roosevelt was justified in concerning
himself with departmental estimates as Secretary Long was
absent from his office and Roosevelt was Acting Secretary.
An Old Acquaintance, "The Personality of President
Roosevelt", Century Magazine. LXIII (1901), 277»
^3 After the days of the Civil War, the sailing ship
disappeared from the modern navies of the world. Up to the
Civil War, the functions of the line officer were considered
as absolutely necessary for the fighting efficiency of the
ship. The engineer officer’s duty was considered more as
supporting the functions of the line officer. However, with
the advent of modern navies, the engineer branch became more
and more important because of the increased use of machinery
on board ship. The status of the engineer officer did not
change, and the line officer was still considered the most
important. With the increased use of machinery on board ship,
the line officer of necessity was becoming more and more of
an engineer. It was recognized that the need no longer
existed for a separate body of engineers responsible for only
a part of the machinery. The need existed for a body of
officers trained in the duties of the modern line officer. In
the navy, then as now, there was the tendency to "empire
building" within a particular branch. With the line officer
becoming more of an engineer because of the increased use of
machinery, antagonism resulted. The problem was partially
solved by the "Personnel Bill" which amalgamated the line
officer and the engineer officer.
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taken an active interest in the matter and in November of
1897 he appointed a board of eleven naval officers who were
to improve the organization of naval personnel. Roosevelt
was assigned the duty of presiding over their session^^

The

"Personnel Bill" which ultimately became law in 1899 sought
to provide for the line and engineer officers in an effort
to eliminate the long standing antagonism between the two.
The board of eleven naval officers favoured the amalgamation
of the two branches. The bill that was finally proposed and
ultimately passed in 1899 provided for vacancies in the navy
list by enforcing retirement.

Without these vacancies,

promotion had been extremely slow.

The new bill provided for

a special board of naval officers in charge of reviewing
careers that could force an officer's retirement in order to
provide vacancies and speed up the promotion of able officers.
The need to review the scheme of promoting officers and the
need to eliminate the existing antagonism between the line and
engineering officers were recognized.

However, every time

proposals had been made by the Secretary of the Navy or the
Assistant Secretary, they had been turned down by one of the
47
Houses.

46
Theodore Roosevelt, "The Genesis of the Personnel
Bill"; Works (New York, 1926) XIV, 281-2. This article was
first published in the North American Review. CLXVII (1898).
Ira N. Hollis, "A New Organization for the Navy",
Atlantic Monthly. LXXX (1897), 309-19.
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The Assistant Secretary did not propose the need
for a personnel bill but he adopted the idea and sought to
give leadership to the board that had been appointed by
Secretary Long. The original plan for the reorganization of
naval personnel to eliminate antagonism was proposed by
Congressman Francis H. Wilson and Professor Holli^f The
49
detailed report submitted by Roosevelt is an indication
of his adoption of any method to improve the efficiency
of the navy.

Roosevelt sought to have the "Personnel Bill"

adopted as it would make the navy a more efficient fighting
machine.

50

Roosevelt sought to improve the training of men and
officers so that when the time of war came they would be
ready.

In his address at the Naval War College, he asked

that the commanders of ships have the most perfect weapons.
Training was to give them skill in the handling of their
51
ships.
During the same month of June, Roosevelt had written
to Secretary Long informing him that communications with
Admiral Sicard indicated that squadron evolutions would take
48

Theodore Roosevelt, "The Genesis of the Personnel
Bill", Works (New York, 1926), XIV, 281.
^9 Elting E. Morison, ed., op. cit.. I, 726-40.
Roosevelt to Long, December 9, 1897.
50
For a comparison of Roosevelt’s ideas on efficiency
with those of Captain Mahan, see above p. 5-6.
Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten Maxim",
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 193.
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. 32
place during August and September of 1897*

Roosevelt told

the Secretary that he had written to Sicard with the hope
that all the armor d a d s would be tried in squadron.

It

would serve little purpose if the Captains of the armor
53
d a d s were undrilled in fleet tactics. Roosevelt placed a
great deal of emphasis on this aspect of training and he
intended to check the squadron manoeuvres himself.
The Assistant Secretary did follow up on the
proposed fleet manoeuvres and later wrote to Long expressing
his intention to be with the fleet for three days: "Monday
is Labor Day: and Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday I shall
54
be down with the squadron."
The Assistant Secretary did
attend the movements of the fleet and he wrote to Lodge
confirming this fact.

He had visited the Atlantic fleet which

included the battleships Iowa and New York, and the gunboat
Puritan among others.

55
Not only was he present for manoeuvres

52

At this time Secretary Long was absent from the
office and Roosevelt was holding the position of Acting
Secretary.
53
Elting E. Morison, ed., pp. cit.. I, 628. Roosevelt
to Long, June 18, 1897»
Ibid.. I, 699 . Roosevelt to Long, September 4, 1897.
55

The Assistant did not initiate the concept of
exercises and manoeuvres; the Department had reorganized
the cruising stations in 1894. At the very same time the
Department arranged to have all vessels on each station
assemble periodically for exercises and manoeuvres.
Annual Report - Secretary of the Navy, 1894» 53rd Congress
3rd Session House Executive Document No. 1, Part III, p. 23.
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but he was present for gun practice as well.

Roosevelt

understood that it was worthless to spend millions of dollars
in the building of a perfect fighting machine if the officers
who were in command of that machine were not perfect them57
selves.
He realized that patient and faithful attention to
detail not only made for an efficient navy, but it made for
well trained personnel as well.

For the Assistant Secretary

the notion of preparedness meant getting each individual aspect
of the Navy Department ready, and that included the training of
men.

58

E. The Concentration of the Fleet
Assistant Secretary Roosevelt dined with President
McKinley on September 20, 1897, and at that time he presented
a paper to the Chief Executive showing him exactly where all
the ships in the navy were.

VThen the junior executive handed

him this paper, the President was impressed.

The Assistant

Secretary proceeded to outline his plan of action if things
looked menacing about Spain.

Roosevelt would have Walker on

Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., pp. pit., I, 275. Roosevelt
to Lodge, September 11, 1897.
57
Theodore Roosevelt, "The Genesis of the Personnel
Bill", Works (New York, 1926), XIV, 289.
3^ For a comparison with what Captain Mahan had to
say concerning the preparation for war and the training of
men, see above pp. 4-6.
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., pp. cit.. I, 278. Roosevelt
to Lodge, September 21, 1897.
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the Cuban coast with the main fleet within forty-eight hours
after war was declared.

He proposed that Evans proceed with

the flying squadron to the coast of Spain and harass the
enemy until some of the battleships stationed near Cuba could

60
be dispatched to aid him.

He urged the necessity "of taking

an immediate and prompt initiative if we wished to avoid the
61
chance of some serious trouble."
Roosevelt had regulated
the Atlantic coast so that it was approaching a state of
preparedness for war.

The proposed actions against Spain

were never taken, but Roosevelt had devoted his every effort
to preparing the department for war.
Roosevelt attempted to organize the Pacific coast so
that it too would be in a state of readiness: "Our Asiatic
squadron should blockade, and if possible take, Manilla. But
if we should hesitate and let the Spaniards take the initia
tive, they could give us great temporary annoyance.
Roosevelt attempted to prepare the Asiatic squadron as his
63
conception of sea power demanded.
On January 14, 1898, the Assistant wrote to Secretary
Ibid.
Ibid.

62 Ibid.
6
Whether Roosevelt actually contemplated the conquest
of the Philippines or merely considered using the Philippines
as an effective way of waging war against Spain through one of
her weak positions is not clear from his letters of this period.

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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Long proposing to alter the position of ships on foreign
stations with a view to concentrating them. The Atlantic
64
65
station also came under his review at this time. Again he
stressed the need for taking the initiatives "When war
comes it should come finally on our initiative, and after
we have had time to p r e p a r e . R o o s e v e l t believed that
force would be used in future relations with international
powers, and the best way to provide that force was to have
the American fleets concentrated. The concentration of the
fleet was a basic principle for Roosevelt.
While at his post, the Assistant Secretary provided
the inspiration for subordinates to reorganize their charges
and prepare the country during peace-time so that if war
came, at least the subordinates would be ready to take the
initiative and be prepared to succeed. The squadrons were
concentrated and the navy could be mobilized in a most
effective manner and in an incredibly short time should a
crisis result with Spain^^

Long was the conservative type

The object of the Atlantic station or the Atlantic
fleet was to protect the eastern seaboard of the United States.
65
Siting E. Mori son, ed., _qp. cit., I, 759.
Roosevelt to Long, January I4 , 1S9S. An essential of
preparedness taught the concentration of the fleet. For a
comparison with Mahan’s views on this subject see above p. 6.
Ibid.. I, 7 6 3 .
E.
S. Maclay. History of the United States Navv
1775 - 1901. rev., (New York, 1^0Î7,'TÎ, 575*
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who would not back an aggressive policy in the department.
Had the Assistant Secretary not acted, in all likelihood the
state of the fleet units would have been less advantageous.

F. The Adoption of a World Outlook
The adoption of a world outlook which entailed Cuba,
the Canal, Hawaii and the Philippines was a major concern
for Roosevelt. The acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands had
long been considered as a strategic necessity by the
Assistant Secretary and those who supported the "large"
p o l i c y . R o o s e v e l t had written to Mahan in confidence
concerning the matter:
I suppose I need not tell you that as regards
Hawaii I take your views absolutely, as indeed
I do on foreign policy generally.
If I had my
way we would annex those islands tomorrow. If
that is impossible we would establish a
protectorate over them. I believe we should
build the Nicaraguan canal at once, and
in the meantime that we should build a dozen
new battleships. 69
Cuba was also a necessity as far as Roosevelt was
concerned.

Early in his public career he desired the
70
Administration to interfere in Cuba.
Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 189#
(Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1959), pp. 147-53, 204-5, 218.
Elting E. Morison, ed., 0£. cit.. I, 607.
Roosevelt to Mahan, May 3, 1897.
70
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., Letters From
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles 1870 - 1918
(New Yorkj 1924), pTTL7 8 . Theodore Roosevelt to Anna
Roosevelt, March 30, 1896.
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He described himself as a "quietly rampant ’Cuba Libre’
man."71

Throughout his tenure as Assistant Secretary he

desired the Administration to interfere in that island’s
affairs:

"I have been hoping and working ardently to bring
72
about our interference in Cuba."
The island was strategi
cally necessary so far as Roosevelt was concerned.
The famous February 25, 1898 dispatch to Dewey which
ordered the squadron to be kept full of coal and to remain
at Hong Kong illustrates Roosevelt’s desire to promote action
73
in that area of the world.
The Assistant Secretary wanted

the United States to look outward. Roosevelt’s world out
look concerned the outlying areas of Cuba, Hawaii and the
Philippines.

These possessions were to be used as coaling

stations for the navy giving the ships an increased radius.
G.

74

The Importance of Commerce

In his public speeches and correspondence as Assist
ant Secretary, Roosevelt followed the concept of a large navy
and patriotism but had very little to say concerning commerce

71

Ibid.« p. 201. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt,
January 2, 1897.
72
Elting E. Morison, ed., 0£. cit., I, 763. Roosevelt
to Sternberg, January 17, 1898.
7^ For a discussion of this dispatch see below pp. 62-4*
74 por Mahan’s views on a world outlook and the
importance of coaling stations see above pp. 7-9.
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which was an essential of the sea power thesis.

The fallacy

of calling Roosevelt an advocate of the entire sea power
thesis results from equating sea power with naval power. It
is evident that the Assistant Secretary was concerned with
naval power as his correspondence for the critical period of
1897 - 1898 illustrates. "But sea power was by no means
76
synonymous with naval power."
Roosevelt failed to recognize
the commercial possibilities of Hawaiian annexation.

He saw

the need for overseas coaling stations such as Hawaii but these
coaling stations were to serve the navy first. The object of
the navy in his eyes was to protect the homelanZ^and ensure
the position of the United States on the international scene.
In his address to the Naval War College he did make a token
reference to the need for the navy to protect commerce. Prior
to the Battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, Roosevelt apparently
did not recognize the importance of commerce.
Perhaps one reason why Roosevelt did not forcefully
support the commercial portion of the sea power thesis while
he was

Assistant Secretary revolved around the attitude of

the business community during those years. Business interests

75

To understand that commerce was of primary impor
tance in Mahan’s concept of sea power, see above pp.9-lC.
William E. Livezey, Mahan On Sea Power (Norman,
Oklahoma, 1947), p. 41.
77

Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten Maxim",
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 192.
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78
had been opposed to Administrative interference in Cuba.
American business journals were opposed to war in 1897,
just as they were opposed to colonial expansion in Hawaii
79
and the Philippines.
After the Battle of Manila Bay, the
business interests became definitely imperialistic if the
desire to retain the Philippines can be taken as evidence
80
of an imperialistic attitude.
Perhaps from reading the business opinion during
1897, Roosevelt concluded that the most important principle
of the sea power thesis was the building of a great navy
with all that it entailed including the acquiring of foreign

7^ Julius V7. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898
(Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1959), p. 22.
79

Ibid., p. 2 4 6 .

dA

After the Battle of Manila Bay the American busi
ness opinion became imperialistic by virtue of the fact that
businessmen desired to retain the Philippines. Julius W.
Pratt, "American Business and the Spanish-American War",
Hispanic American Historical Review, XIV (1934), 195-6.
American business realized that the threatened markets in
China could be defended from this new post. Even before the
conclusion of the peace with Spain the business segment of
the American people was building high hopes upon the supposed
opportunities for trade and exploitation in the Philippines.
Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists
xpansl
of 1898 (Gloucester,
Massachusetts, 1959), p. 278.
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possessions to be used as coaling stations.

Regardless

of what influenced Roosevelt, he did not forcefully express
any notions with regard to the commercial segment of the
sea power thesis.
After the Spanish American War of 1898, Roosevelt’s
new concern for commerce is seen in his speech before the
Hamilton Club, Chicago, April 1 0 , 1899.

This speech was
82
later reprinted under the title "The Strenuous Life."
We cannot sit huddled within our ovm borders
and avow ourselves merely an assemblage of wellto-do hucksters who care nothing what happens
beyond.
Such a policy would defeat even its own
end; for as the nations grow to have even wider
and wider interests, and are brought into
closer and closer contact, if we are to hold
our own in the struggle for naval and commercial
supremacy CItalics mine3 we must build up our
power without our own borders. We must build
the isthmian canal, and we must grasp the points

81

With regard to the question of coaling stations,
it must be remembered that Cuba was not the only possibility.
An offer for the Americans to take over Samanâ Bay appeared
as early as 1869. The project of annexing the Dominican
Republic to the United States was almost realized when it
was discovered that annexation was not a spontaneous feeling
of the Dominican people. The negotiations then broke down.
Sumner Welles, Naboth’s Vineyard ; The Dominican Republic
1844 - 1924 (New York, 1928) , Ï,' 359
With the outbreak
of the Spanish War, popular opinion was still much opposed to
the yoluntary cession of Samanà Bay to the Americans but
the Dictator Heureaux made it known to the Americans through
the Consul (April 29, 1898) that no opposition from the
Dominican Republic’s government would result if the American
government took possession of Samanâ Bay. Ibid.. II, 529.
82
Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life", Works
(New York, 1926), XIII, 319-31. This essay was one of a
collection of essays included in a work of Roosevelt entitled
The Strenuous Life, first published in 1900. The Strenuous
Life was included in the 1926 edition of his Works.

-’
TÔT»
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of vantage which will enable us to have our say
in deciding the destiny of the oceans of the
East and West.
83
A further evidence of this new interest in commerce
was his desire to keep the flag flying over the Philippines
because it would create a market for American factories.

On

September 30, 1 9 0 0 , the Kansas City Sunday Journal quoted
Roosevelt as saying: "We are for expansion and anything else
that will tend to benefit the American laborer and manu84
facturer."
He had come to realize the importance of
commerce and what it meant to the greatness of a nation, but
prior to May 1, 1898, he made little mention of this impor
tant factor of national greatness.

Prior to the Battle of

Manila Bay, Roosevelt was convinced that the prime factor
was the navy with all that it entailed.

The Assistant Sec

retary had reached the conclusion that a big naval policy
had to be followed largely because of the emotional appeal
of patriotism and nationalism.

The navy could defend the

country and enforce the Monroe Doctrine.
Despite the very close connection maintained between
Mahan and Roosevelt through their correspondence, they difâ5
fered on the importance of commerce.
One could say that
Ibid.. pp. 323-4..
Cited by Howard K. Beale. Theodore Roosevelt and
the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956), p. ?6 .
For a comparison of this with the importance that
Mahan placed upon commerce, see above pp. 9-10.
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because of his actions Roosevelt proved himself to be an
advocate of the entire sea power thesis, expressing it
largely in terms of naval power.
attention to commerce.

He gave only token

The sea power historian, Captain

Mahan, on the other hand explained the sea power thesis
largely in terms of the commercial benefits that could be
obtained.
Roosevelt was convinced of the need to use force to
replace arbitration to increase the size of the navy, to
prepare for war in time of peace, to concentrate the fleet,
and to adopt a world outlook.
of the sea power thesis.

These were basic principles

However, the Assistant Secretary

had little to say concerning the importance of commerce which
was the basic principle of the sea power thesis. Roosevelt’s
concept of sea power was based on naval supremacy and not
commercial supremacy.
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CHAPTER IV
SEA POWER CONCEPTS IN ACTION DESPITE JOHN D. LONG
During the period from April 1897 to May 1898
Secretary of the Navy John D. Long retained his conserv
ative outlook on life.

This was in direct contrast to the

aggressiveness of Roosevelt.

Long did not consider the

Department of the Navy as being important and he was in the
habit of absenting himself from the office and leaving
Roosevelt in charge. This is possibly due to a number of
reasons, one of them being his indifferent health.^

Long

had been prevented from taking an active part in the
Presidential campaign of 1896 because of ill health.
Washington is noted for having very warm and uncomfortable
weather during the summer and this perhaps accounts for
Long’s extended absence during the summer of 1897*
The idea of leaving his post may have been the
result of his administrative procedures.

In February of

1898 Long wrote in his journal:
I make Cit3 a point not to trouble myself
overmuch to acquire a thorough knowledge of the
details pertaining to any branch of the service.
^ Howard C. Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean
(Chicago, 1 9 2 7 ), p. 2 6 .
2
Lawrence Shaw Mayo, ed., America of Yesterday
as Reflected in the Journal of John Davis Long (Boston. 1923),
p. l46.
51
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Such knowledge would undoubtedly be a very
valuable equipment, but the range is so
enormous I could make little progress, and
that at great expense of health and time, in
mastering it. My plan is to leave all such
matters to the bureau chiefs, or other officers
at naval stations or on board ship, limiting
myself to the general direction of affairs. 3
Long was more concerned over the small matters of the office
such as "personal appeals, and personal claims."^
A. Selling Sea Power Ideas
Roosevelt’s correspondence from April 1897 to May
1898 indicates that Long was absent from the office on a
number of occasions. On April 22, 1897, Roosevelt was
Acting Secretary of the Navy. Japan was showing an increased
interest in the Hawaiian Islands at that time and Roosevelt
took the opportunity to go to President McKinley and assure
him that the cruiser Philadelphia was in the Islands and
that other ships could steam there at once if Japan actually
did send her forces.^ The door to the White House^ had been
opened and Roosevelt was going to have access to the
executive mansion.
3

Ibid., p. 1 5 7 .

LIbid.

^ Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Rooseyelt A Biography
(New York, 1931), 171.

6

The term White House was not officially used until
1902 when President Rooseyelt had the term White House
stamped on all the stationery coming from the executive
mansion.
(
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Roosevelt made it a point to acquaint himself with
naval docks, yards and vessels.

Early in May of 1897, just

after taking the position of Assistant Secretary, he
investigated the damage to a torpedo boat and submitted an
official report to the Secretary.

After informing the

Secretary that no serious damage had been done the Assistant
Secretary stated: "The business of a naval officer is one
which, above all others, needs daring and decision and if he
must err on either side the nation can best afford to have
him err on the side of too much daring rather than too much
7
caution."
The report was hailed by the press
'ei
as revealing
8
a new spirit in the Department of the Navy.
This new spirit in the Navy Department continued to
manifest itself when Roosevelt delivered his address at the
Naval War College.

9

The speech was
very coolly by
IS received
]
10
the Secretary; he did not like it.
Roosevelt’s correspondence with Long indicates that
the Secretary was absent from Washington on vacation between
June 16 and July 2, 1897*^

Roosevelt dined with President

7

Cited by Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and
His Time (New York, 1920), I, 73.
^ Ibid.
9
For a discussion of Roosevelt’s address to the Naval
War College, see above pp.24-6.
10
Elting E. Morison, ed., Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951), I, 623. Roosevelt
to Mahan, June 9, 1897.
Ibid.. I, 628. Roosevelt to Long, June 18, 1897*
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McKinley that same month of June while Long was absent from
Washington and during the course of the evening the President
expressed himself very strongly on the question of going
12
ahead with the upbuilding of the navy.
It is not normal
procedure for an Assistant Secretary to dine with the
President as this is usually restricted to the more impor
tant government officials.

However, as an Acting Secretary

it was permissable for Roosevelt to confer with the President
on matters of policy and this could serve to counterbalance
a conservative outlook that Long tried to maintain in the
Department.

Roosevelt became Acting Secretary when Long

left the office.
Despite Roosevelt’s pressure, indications are that
Secretary Long possessed a lukewarm attitude
question of the increase of the navy.

13

on the

Roosevelt wrote to

Long: "I know you will excuse my saying that I can’t help
being sorry you have reached the conclusion that we are not
to go on at all in building even, say, one battleship and
five torpedo - b o a t s . R o o s e v e l t proposed writing an

12

Ibid.. I, 6 2 7 . Roosevelt to Lodge, June 17, 1897.

Ibid., I, 6 2 2 . Roosevelt to Mahan, June 9, 1897*
"In strict confidence I want to tell you that Secretary Long
is only lukewarm about building up our Navy."
Cited by Joseph B. Bishop, 0£. cit.. I, 82.
Roosevelt to Long, August 26, 1897.
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article concerning the views of the Presidents’ with respect
to the navy and he submitted it to Long for approval.

Ever

since the Address to the Naval War College, Long demanded
that Roosevelt submit articles intended for publication to
him.

The article (apparently never published) contained a

strong plea for the strengthening of the navy and the Sec
retary’s comment upon that article shows that he was opposed
to the principle of the upbuilding of that force.

Roosevelt

brought the article to the President’s attention.

Roosevelt

had written to the President:’’On the first page, where I
speak of the need of strengthening the Navy, the words ’in
my own opinion,’ were put in at the suggestion of the Secre
tary, to whom I of course submitted the article.
In the early part of September Roosevelt met with the
President and secured an overruling of the Secretary concern
ing the principle of the increase of the navy. Long was again
absent from Washington at that time.

The President intended

that the department "should go on building up the Navy, with
battleships and torpedo boats, and that he did not think the
Secretary would recommend anything he (the President) Csic]
did not a p p r o v e . R o o s e v e l t had used his personal influence
15

Elting E. Morison, ed.,
cit.. I, 644. Roosevelt
to President McKinley, August 30, 1ÏÏ97.
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed.. Selections from the
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge
1884 - 1918 (New York, 192$), I, 277. Roosevelt to Lodge,
September 1$, 1897.
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to obtain the enforcement of the sea power ideas in direct
contradiction to the conservative policy that was set down
by Secretary Long.

It would have been difficult for Long

to disagree with the President after the President had
already given his approval to the theory of the increase
to Roosevelt.

At this time the President "expressed great

satisfaction with what I had done, especially during the
last seven weeks that I have been in charge of the Department."

17

This would indicate that Long was absent from his

office from the beginning of August and he did not return
until September 29, 1897.

For two straight months Roosevelt

had complete charge of the Department of the Navy.
Long’s absence was a test of the Assistant’s initi
ative and Roosevelt needed very little encouragement.

It

,

was obvious that Long was not in line with the jeune ecole

18

of the 1890’s and the only way to get those ideas into effect
was to act at every opportunity.

Roosevelt did just that.

That Roosevelt was taking the initiative in the
organization and administration of the Navy Department was
implied when someone sent him an article from the Boston

17

Ibid.. I, 276-7 .

The term jeune ecole was used to identify those
who were adopting the notions of the sea power thesis with
its resultant world outlook. This school of the jeune ecole
had adopted the notions of the "large policy". Writers who
criticized this new school often used the term jeune ecole
when speaking of it. Fred T. Jane, "Naval Warfare: Present
and Future", Forum. XXIV (1897), 240.
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Herald» That article, written in the early part of September
while Long was on vacation and Roosevelt was holding the
position of Acting Secretary, stated in effect that Roosevelt
was trying to assume the functions of the Secretary. The
article made Roosevelt uncomfortable and he wrote to the
Secretary telling him so.

19

He attempted to justify his

actions to that point: "I have appreciated very much the
confidence you have put in me by letting me act during these
two months, and I have had constantly before me the purpose
never either to do or to fail to do anything save in
20
accordance with your desires."
These words seem to indicate
that Roosevelt lacked confidence and initiative. However,
the Assistant Secretary realized that he would have to be
extremely cautions so as not to let the Secretary think that
he was interfering with him or presuming on his own position
21
as Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
In his continuing effort to take the initiative in
the Department, Roosevelt went to see the President just two
days after writing to Secretary Long concerning the Boston
Herald article. After dining with the President he

Elting E. Morison, ed., op. cit.. I, 682.
Roosevelt to Long, September 18, 1897.
Ibid.
Ibid., I, 6 0 9 . Theodore Roosevelt to Anna
Roosevelt, May 7, 1897•

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58
gave him a paper showing exactly where all the ships in the
22
navy were.
At the same time the Assistant Secretary pro
posed an aggressiye program for the Philippines and for
23
Cuba as well.
The Boston Herald article and the visits
to the President indicate that during the period that
Roosevelt was in charge he had gone a long way in taking
over the entire Department.

Long was becoming a mere figure

head in his office.
With this new position of influence, the Assistant
sought to increase the pressure on the Secretary concerning
2A

"the need for an increase in the Navy."

The pressure was

having its effect but Roosevelt was still disappointed with
the Secretary’s attitude.

The Assistant wanted Long to haye

a more forceful attitude on international matters: "The
Secretary has been a dear, as he always is; I only wish I
could poison his mind so as to make him a shade more truc25
ulent in international matters."
This never came about
though sea power enthusiasts saw that partial recognition

22

Henry Cabot Lodge,
Roosevelt to Lodge, September
23
For the discussion
wasproposed by Roosevelt see

ed.,
cit.« I, 278.
21, 1ÏÏ97.
of this aggressive program that
above pp. 41-2 ■

Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., op. cit.. I, 284* Roosevelt
to Lodge, September 29, 1897. Also Elting E. Morison, ed.,
o p . cit., I, 6 7 1 . Roosevelt to Long, September 10, 1897.
Also ibid.. I, 695. Roosevelt to Long, September 30, 1897*
25

Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., Letters From Theodore
Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles 1870-1918 (New York. iv24),
p. 2 09 . Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, October 28, 1897.
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had been won in early November concerning the increase in
the navy: "Now in strict confidence, we have won as regards
the principle of extension of the Navy with the Secretary;
he will recommend one additional battleship and additional
torpedo boats.

It is too little but it is a recognition of

the principle that we are not to stop."^^
B . 'Sea Power Ideas Actually Operating
In an effort to bring the Asiatic station to a state
of preparedness, Roosevelt sought to have George Dewey ap
pointed to the Asiatic command.

The Assistant Secretary had

followed the career of this officer and knew that he possessed
27
the daring and initiative
that were essential for a naval
officer in the age of sea power.

28

Mahan had seen the need

for efficiency in the navy and had been urging Roosevelt as
early as May 1, 1897, to see that the best Admiral be
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., o£. cit., I, 294. Roosevelt
to Lodge, November 5, 1897.
27 Henry F. Pringle, £ p . cit., p. 178.
28 After the Spanish American War, Roosevelt gave some
idea of what other officers thought concerning Dewey. "In the
summer of 1897 there were in Washington captains and commanders
who later won honor for themselves and their country in the war
with Spain, and who were already known for the dash and skill
with which they handled their ships, the excellence of their
gun practice, the good discipline of their crews, and the
eager desire to win honorable renown. All these men were a
unit in their faith in the then Commodore Dewey, in their
desire to serve under him, should the chance arise, and in
their unquestioning belief that he was the man to meet an
emergency in a way that would do credit to the flag."
Theodore Roosevelt, "Admiral Dewey", Works (New York, 1926),
XIII, 421.
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appointed in the Pacific for "much more initiative may be
29
thrown on him than can be on the Atlantic man."
Roosevelt
was impatient of any red tape that would prevent his quest
for preparedness from being achieved. Dewey later commented
on his appointment:
With the enthusiastic candor which characterizes
him, he CRooseveltH declared that I ought to have
the Asiatic Squadron. He asked me if I had any
political influence.
I expressed a natural dis
inclination to use it. He agreed with the cor
rectness of my view as an officer, but this was a
situation where it must be used in self-defence. 30
Roosevelt used the political influence of Republican Senator
Proctor of Vermont to have Dewey appointed to the command of
the Asiatic squadron.

It had been secured by the Assistant

31
Secretary against the wishes of Secretary Long.^

Long wanted

Commodore Howell, who was first in line to the next opening of
a command because of his seniority. Long busied himself with
personal appeals and personal claims while he was Secretary of
the Navy and he was angered at Proctor’s visit to McKinley
which ensured Dewey’s appointment.

An indication of his dis

pleasure is witnessed when Dewey received his orders on
October 21, 1897, and sailed for the Atlantic station with
Cited by William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power,
(Norman, Oklahoma, 1947), p. 125. Mahan to Roosevelt, May 1,
1897 in the Roosevelt papers.

George Dewey, Autobiographv of George Dewey
(New York, 1913), p. loo.
Joseph B. Bishop, o£. cit., I, 96.
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.

the rank of Commodore in December of 1897*

32

It was custom

ary for squadron commanders to hold the rank of Admiral.
Dewey was not appointed to the rank of Admiral until after
the battle of Manila Bay.

Roosevelt was Acting Secretary

of the Navy on the day that Dewey was appointed.

A letter

recommending that Howell be appointed was held on Long's
desk by Roosevelt until Dewey secured the appointment.

33

Dewey's appointment was a definite effort on the part of
32

There is a controversy over this appointment
steming from the various accounts of the participants. As
shown above, Dewey on the advice of Roosevelt used political
influence to obtain the position. Secretary Long speaks of
the appointment of Dewey and states that: "Political or
personal influence had nothing to do with his selection."
John Davis Long, "The New American Navy; The Battle of
Manila Bay", Outlook, LXXIII (1903), 784. He repeats this
same view on another occasion? "I decided to give Dewey the
Asiatic and Howell the European Station, and this arrange
ment, on my submitting it to President McKinley, who had made
no suggestion in the matter, and who always left such matters
to the Secretary, was approved by him.
I remember his simply
saying to me, in his characteristically pleasant way, 'Are
you satisfied that Dewey is a good man for the place and that
his head is level?' to which I affirmatively answered.
Political or personal influence had nothing to do with his
selection, which was entirely my own." John Davis Long, The
New American Navy (New York, 1903), I, 177. It is wise to
accept Dewey's interpretation of his appointment as Long is
often inaccurate.
A careful reading of his work reveals this.
With regard to the appointment of the Assistant Secretary he
gives the impression that he had an entirely free hand and
selected Roosevelt from among several candidates. Long states:
"In May, 1897, . . . I selected Roosevelt." Ibid., II, 173.
On the other hand in his journal under the date of April 9,
1897 he writes: "Roosevelt calls. Just appointed Assistant
Secretary of the Navy. Best man for the place." Lawrence Shaw
Mayo, ed., op. cit., p. 147.
Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Boston and New
York, 1931), p. 86.
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Roosevelt to further his plans of promoting sea power ideas
in the Department of the Navy.
The sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbour
on February 15, 1898, convinced Roosevelt that some action had
to be taken.
to Long.

On February 19, 1898, he wrote a pleading letter

In view of the disaster to the Maine, the Secretary

should recommend the authorization of four battleships by
Congress in order to meet the needs of the country.

Not only

would it be of great service to the country but it would be
34
of great service to the Administration as well.
The Assist
ant's letter alarmed Secretary Long and he wrote a personal
note to Roosevelt in his own hand commanding the Assistant
to revoke an order he had issued in regard to getting naval
vessels ready for action and informing him that he would be
absent for the day:

"Do not take any such step affecting

the policy of the Administration without consulting the Pres
ident or me.

I am not away from town and my intention was to

have you look after the routine of the office while I get a
quiet day off."

35

Roosevelt's desire to enforce sea power

ideas on the Department was taking the form of direct orders.
The clearest manifestation that the Assistant Sec
retary had adopted sea power notions was the famous dispatch
Elting E. Morison, ed., op. cit.. I, 780.
Roosevelt to Long, February 19, 1898%
35
Cited by Joseph B. Bishop, pp. cit.. I, 86. Long
to Roosevelt, February 25, 1898.
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that was sent out on the afternoon of February 25, 1898, while
Secretary Long was absent from the office.

This dispatch

greatly shocked John D. Long who confided to his diary:
He seemed to be thoroughly loyal, but the very
devil seemed to possess him yesterday after
noon.
Having the authority for that time of
Acting Secretary he immediately began to launch
peremptory orders: distributing ships; ordering
ammunition, which there is no means to move, to
places where there is no means to store it; . .
. sending messages to Congress for immediate
legislation, authorizing the enlistment of an
unlimited number of seamen; and ordering guns
from the Navy Yard at Washington to New York,
with a view to arming auxiliary cruisers which
are now in peaceful commercial pursuit. 37
Many authors since John Long have treated the dis
patch as the impulsive act of a subordinate who took ad
vantage of a time when his chief was absent from his post.
38
In fact, the dispatch was sent after consultation with Lodge
and after several weeks of serious thought.

From the re

action of Secretary Long, it is plain that the message did
not reflect the attitude of Roosevelt's superior, yet it did
This dispatch is reprinted in its entirety in
George Dewey, pp. cit.. p. 179. "The message to the Asiatic
Squadron bore the signature of that assistant secretary, who
had seized the opportunity, while acting secretary, to
hasten preparations for a conflict which was inevitable. As
Mr. Roosevelt reasoned, precautions would cost little in
time of peace and would be invaluable in case of war."
37

Lawrence S. Mayo, ed., pp. cit., pp. 169-70.

Roosevelt and Lodge conspired to send the dis
patch to Dewey to begin "offensive operations in the Philippine
Islands." They revealed this after the war was over.- Henry
Cabot Lodge, ed., pp. cit.. I, 349. Roosevelt to Lodge,
September-26, 1898.
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not exceed the limits of reasonable military precaution.

39

From that day until the time of his resignation in May of
1898, there is no indication that Roosevelt was allowed to
be Acting Secretary again.
Several weeks before the actual hostilities broke
out, L. A. Thurston, an Hawaiian treaty commissioner in
40
Washington, suggested to the Department of the Navy the
desirability of buying all the coal in the islands in pre
paration for war.

Roosevelt immediately sent off letters

and dispatches to achieve that purpose.

The purchases were

completed and on April 12, 1898, the Hawaiian executive
council voted to allow four additional esplanade lots for
storage p u r p o s e s . N o detail was overlooked. Roosevelt was
unsatisfied with the position of the Department because it
was not doing more, but the organization was well on the way
to being fully prepared.
With everything in readiness Roosevelt maintained
his intimate connection with Captain Mahan during the last
months before the war in 1898.

He wanted to be certain that

the best advice of this naval Captain would be offered if
it could contribute in any way to the success of the entire
Elting E. Morison, ed., pp. cit., I, 784.
^'3 A good account of Thurston's part in the Hawaiian
annexation is given in Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898
(Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1959).
Thomas A. Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii
During the Spanish American War", American Historical Review.
XXXVI (1931), 555.
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venture.

He sent the sea power historian the tentative plan

of the campaign that the Assistant Secretary and his sub
ordinate department heads had developed: "Will you send it
42
back to me with any comments you see fit to make."
Mahan
offered his suggestions on the plan a few days later, and
Roosevelt promised to show the suggestions to Secretary Long
43
and then get some of the members of the Board to go over it.
That the Assistant Secretary was anxious to have war started
there is little doubt. On April 1, 1898, he wrote to his
sister: "As for matters here, I ’d give all I ’m worth to be
just two days in supreme command.

I'd be perfectly willing

to resign, for I'd have things going so that nobody could
stop them."^^
do no more.

Long remained at his post and Roosevelt could
If a war came, it would be a test of the pre

paredness of the Department of the Navy.

The Assistant Sec

retary had gone a long way in his attempt to sell sea power
ideas to the important men of the country.

Now he could only

wait.

Elting E. Morison, ed., pp. pit., I, 796. Roosevelt
to Mahan, March 16, 1898.
43

Ibid.. I, 797. Roosevelt to Mahan, March 21, 1898.

Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., pp. cit., p. 212.
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, April 1, 1898.
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CHAPTER V
SOME FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Roosevelt did not have to wait long for war as it
was officially declared on April 25, 1898. Manila Bay was
a test of the completeness of Roosevelt's preparations. The
Navy had only to take the initiative to obtain the
advantage.

Dewey made the first move to locate the Spanish

fleet, but if Roosevelt’s preparations had not been complete
the Asiatic Squadron in all likelihood would not have
succeeded.

Commodore Dewey steamed into Manila Bay on May 1,

1898, and completely demolished the Spanish fleet after
several hours of fighting.

The United States' fleet was

barely touched and suffered few casualties in comparison
with the Spanish. Dewey was successful, but without the
Assistant Secretary’s preliminary labours the naval victory
at Manila Bay would likely have been impossible.^
Lodge realized that Roosevelt's efforts in the
direction of preparedness had produced the desired results:
"You in the midst of your own triumphs and dangers I know
will have many thoughts for the glory won by the American

George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey
(New York, 1913), pp. 170-72. Also Harold and Margaret
Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776 - 1918
(Princeton, Ï939)» P* 230.

66
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2
Navy, which you did so much to prepare."

An anonymous

contributor to the Harper's Weekly Magazine commented upon
the record of the administration and implied that the war
was fought out before it was begun. The preparations that
had been made in Washington (largely due to the efforts of
Roosevelt) were so completed during the time of peace that
when war did come the Secretary knew at what point on the
map every ship could be most promptly reached by cable.
Naval yards had been organized so that the yards knew how
long it would take to put idle ships into commission. The
3
position of ammunition and stores was known. The Department
was so well organized that any question that the Secretary
4
could ask could be answered in five minutes. The conduct of
the war and the speed with which it was terminated made this
a valid observation.^
After the war with Spain had been fought, the former

2

Henry Cabot Lodge, ed.. Selections from the
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge
1884 - 1918 (New York, 19251, I, 319. Lodge to Roosevelt, '
July 6, 1398.
3
Stores is a naval terra and it includes provisions
and all material that is not permantly attached to the ship.
^ Anonymous, "The Record of the Administration",
Harper's Weekly. XLV (1901), 251.
3 The reference here to the preparation for and the
speed with which the war was terminated refers to the Depart
ment of the Navy and not the Army. The army had trouble with
its logistics and the confusion at Tampa where the array was
preparing for the expedition to Cuba bares witness to this
fact. Frank Freidel, The Splendid Little War (New York, 1958),
pp. 47-5 5 .
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Assistant Secretary realized the major factors which influ
enced the outcome.
it was prepared.

In the first place, the navy won because
Secondly, the navy won because of the

seamanship and gunnery that had been handed down by service

6
tradition and which had been perfected by patient work.
Because of the never ending practice in the handling of
ships and guns at sea in all kinds of weather, the blockade
of Santiago was successful and the Battle of Manila Bay
7
likewise.
The commodores and captains who took active
part in the war had commanded fleets in sea
service, or at least had been in command of
single ships in these fleets. There was not
one thing they were to do in war that they
had not done in peace save actually receive
the enemy’s fire. 6
The navy won because it was prepared, and Dewey won the Battle
9
of Manila Bay because of the splendid seamanship of the service.

6

Theodore Roosevelt, ’’Preparedness and Unpreparedness” ,
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 409. This
article was first published in The Century (1699).
^ Ibid.. XIII, 416.
^ Ibid.. XIII, 417.
Q

Theodore Roosevelt, ’’Admiral Dewey” , Works (New
York, 1926), XIII, 4 2 4 . This article was first published in
McClure’s Magazine (1699). This article contains a very fine
defense for the need of training personnel. ”The victory
would not have been possible had it not been for the un
wearied training and practice given the navy . . . by the
admirals, the captains, and the crews who incessantly and in
all weathers kept their vessels exercised, singly and in
squadron, until the men on the bridge, the men in the gunturrets, and the men in the engine - rooms knew how to do
their work perfectly, alone or together.” Ibid.. p. 427*
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The Administration had received criticism for its
actions^ but Long realized that despite the criticism, the
war was a success.

If one were to read Long’s account of the

war written in 1902, the Secretary would emerge as a sea
power enthusiast; ’’The war with Spain taught afresh the value

11
of sea power.”
The movement of the ships in the Atlantic
12
and Pacific and the object of crushing the Spanish squadron
13
in the Philippines while controlling the Atlantic are spoken
of as objectives of the Department. Of course, as head of the
Department Long would get a share of the credit when in
reality these timely moves were the result of Roosevelt’s
initiative and inspiration. Even the orders to Dewey that
were sent on February 25, 1696 are spoken of in terms of a
14
Departmental action. Roosevelt’s name is hardly mentioned
Former President Cleveland was quite critical of
the actions of the administration during this year. He
regarded the proposed annexation of the Hawaiian Islands as
a perversion of the national mission. Statement to the
Associated Press January 24, 1696, in Allan Nevins, ed..
Letters of Grover Cleveland 1650 - 1906 (Boston, 1933), pp.
491-2. Many of Cleveland’s letters during this year have a
querulous and critical tone. He was against the jingoism
which swept the country into war with Spain and the wave of
imperialist feeling which led Americans to support the policy
of overseas expansion. Ibid.. p. 471. These were principles
of the sea power thesis.
John Davis Long,’’The New American Navy; Building
the New Navy” , Outlook. LXXII (1902), 644.
12
John Davis Long, ”The New American Navy; Pre
paring for the War with Spain” , Outlook. LXXIII (1903), 576.

13

John Davis Long, ’’The New American Navy; The
Battle of Manila Bay” , Outlook. LXXIII (1903), 760.
Ibid.. LXXIII, 766.
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and all directives are spoken of in terms of the Department.
The work Roosevelt attempted to do with respect to the pre
paration of the navy was certainly not due to the leadership
of Long as he was against the principles of the sea power
thesis. Yet Long states:
The difficulty experienced in adding
warships to the navy when the country was
on the eve of hostilities shows the danger
and folly of a policy which trusts to the
last moment to make preparation. 15
He had come to the support of the sea power thesis, but his
actions while Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary were much
the opposite.
While Roosevelt was Assistant, Secretary all indications
are that Long did not agree with the principle of the sea power
thesis and was opposed to the increase of the navy. He may have

16

admired Roosevelt but the Secretary proved to be an obstacle
when it came to introducing the notions of the "large policy".
It would be foolish to imply that Roosevelt was completely
responsible for the introduction of sea power ideas into the
Department of the Navy but it must be stated that his corre
spondence and memoranda gave the needed inspiration for these
John Davis Long, The New American Navy (New York,
1903), I, 151.

Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 0£. cit.. I, 253* Lodge
to Roosevelt, March 6, 1697. Lodge had spoken to Long con
cerning Roosevelt at which time Long stated: "Roosevelt has
the character, standing ability and reputation to entitle
him to be a Cabinet Minister. Is not this too small for himi"
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ideas which are lacking in the conservative outlook of Long.
Throughout this period Long appears as the kindly old man who
was susceptible to personal influence. Roosevelt was never at
rest and it was his leadership and inspiration in the absence
of Secretary Long that was largely responsible for the intro
duction of the notions of sea power into the Department of
the Navy.

Long might have been able to control his department

to a greater degree had he remained at his post continually
and not left Roosevelt in charge.
Looking back on Roosevelt's period as Assistant Sec
retary of the Navy we can see two main themes running through
his activities. The first of these themes reflects his appli
cation of Mahan's ideas in Roosevelt's peculiarly chauvinistic
way, emphasizing the power aspect to the point of even ignor
ing the central commercial orientation of Mahan's ideas.
Having used Mahan's means almost to the neglect of
Mahan's goals he pushed in a Rooseveltian, aggressive fashion
for the navy that was to make his country's world power felt.
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